Institutions: New Money Cannot Buy the Time Needed to Build a Grid – Asia’s Power Balance, Part 4

By Kelly in Tokyo

AI is driving up electricity demand, but grid expansion is failing to keep pace with the growth of computing capacity. Turmoil in the Strait of Hormuz has also transmitted energy risk into Asian power prices. The first three articles in this series examined demand, supply and external shocks. This article asks a different question: if both funding and projects are increasing, why can electricity still not reach the places that need it in time?

The problem is not a lack of money. A report issued by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in November estimates that Southeast Asia will require USD7.1 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2040, including about USD3.6 trillion for the power sector. Public investment is expected to cover only 45%, leaving an annual financing gap of roughly USD264 billion.

In a November speech, ADB President Masato Kanda said: ‘Capital is not the binding constraint. What is truly scarce is investable projects.’ His point highlights the other side of the problem. Capital can seek out projects, but whether those projects are ready for construction depends on planning, approvals, financing and institutional arrangements.

Demand is not lacking either. Under Wood Mackenzie’s base-case scenario, power demand from Southeast Asian data centres will rise from about 2.6GW in 2025 to 10.7GW in 2035. Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor has a data-centre project pipeline totalling 2.87GW, but local grid capacity and substations are under pressure. Some large projects may wait more than 18 months for a connection.

From Southeast Asia’s cross-border grid and Northeast Asia’s power infrastructure to energy investment in Central Asia, conditions differ but the underlying question is the same: how can the pace of power-system development keep up with economic growth?

The ASEAN Power Grid: An Agreement Does Not End the Wait

In November 2026, all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations completed the signing of a memorandum of understanding on strengthening the ASEAN Power Grid. The Philippine Department of Energy called it ‘an important milestone in regional energy cooperation.’ Covering infrastructure planning, institutional arrangements, regulatory development and financing channels, the memorandum outlines a framework for connecting the region’s power networks.

One phrase, however, deserves attention: electricity-market integration will proceed on a ‘voluntary and progressive’ basis, with respect for national autonomy.

‘Voluntary’ means each member can decide how far to participate according to its own circumstances. ‘Progressive’ means regional cooperation must move step by step and cannot simply follow corporate investment and construction timetables.

Cross-border power cooperation is not starting from zero. The Lao PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore Power Integration Project has operated for years. A second-phase agreement signed in January 2026 raised the project’s electricity-trading capacity from 100MW to as much as 200MW.

Two hundred megawatts is a meaningful amount of power, but it remains limited beside the rapid expansion of Southeast Asia’s data-centre industry. A single large data centre may require a comparable volume of reliable electricity, and many facilities are being built or planned across the region.

ASEAN has incorporated grid interconnection into its regional vision for 2045. Yet there is still a long road from a cooperation framework to broader integration of electricity markets.

A data-centre building can be completed according to a company’s construction schedule, but its power supply does not depend on the project alone. Delays in domestic grid upgrades, cross-border electricity trading or the coordination of regional rules can all hold back new supply.

This is the practical contradiction facing cross-border grid development. Companies want to advance projects month by month or quarter by quarter, while power cooperation between countries requires alignment on planning, regulation and the distribution of benefits. Signing an agreement is only the beginning. Delivering electricity to where it is needed requires a series of detailed arrangements.

Grid-Connection Deposits: Thailand Raises the Bar for Capacity Reservations

Cross-border grid cooperation takes time, and domestic grid capacity cannot be reserved without limit.

In May 2026, Thailand introduced an electricity commitment deposit for large power users. Data-centre developers reserving substantial grid capacity must provide a financial guarantee of THB4.5 million per megawatt. For a 100MW project, the guarantee amounts to about THB450 million.

This is not simply a connection fee. It is intended to discourage projects from reserving capacity without proceeding to construction. Some companies had applied early and occupied grid capacity, then failed to build on schedule. As a result, projects genuinely ready for investment were left waiting for a connection.

For grid operators, capacity reservations must correspond to real investment and electricity demand, not remain applications on paper. By raising the financial threshold for reserving capacity, regulators hope to reduce the amount tied up by projects that never materialise.

The screening mechanism also creates a new institutional cost. For a well-capitalised operator, the guarantee is one component of project investment. For a developer with limited funds, it may become a genuine barrier to entering the grid-connection queue.

The policy has a practical rationale. When capacity is scarce, reducing speculative or ineffective reservations helps preserve resources for projects that are ready to build. At the same time, it raises another issue: when electricity becomes a decisive condition for data-centre investment, access to a connection depends not only on project design and technical requirements, but also on financial strength.

The allocation of grid capacity is shifting from a purely engineering matter into an institutional issue involving investment commitments, regulatory rules and market fairness.

Why ADB Funding Cannot Be Turned into Electricity Overnight

Of the USD7.1 trillion in investment needs identified by the ADB, power and transport together account for about 85%. Digital infrastructure requires a further USD584 billion.

Investment statistics separate the two categories. Power investment covers generation, transmission and cross-border interconnection, while digital-infrastructure investment includes data centres, broadband networks and submarine cables. In practice, however, the two are difficult to separate.

The location of a data centre depends not only on land, taxation and network connectivity, but also on access to a stable power supply. A facility can be completed and its servers installed, but if substations lack capacity and transmission upgrades remain unfinished, the investment cannot be converted into operating capacity.

Data-centre construction in Johor, the grid-connection queue in Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor and the grid-upgrade plans of Malaysia’s national electricity company all illustrate the same relationship: the faster the digital economy expands, the greater the demands placed on power infrastructure.

The ADB also identifies a shortage of ‘well-prepared projects’ as a major obstacle to private capital entering infrastructure. In other words, financing is not the only issue. Too few projects are genuinely ready to move into construction.

For investors, a well-prepared project means at least that approvals are clearly defined, land and transmission-route plans are in place, grid access is secured, procurement is transparent and returns can be estimated with reasonable confidence.

Every one of these conditions matters. Unclear rules prevent investors from assessing risk; inadequate project preparation means construction cannot begin even when funding is available. Predictable rules, transparent procurement and advance preparation may be less visible than generators or transmission lines, but they directly determine whether capital reaches the construction stage.

The larger problem is time. Financing and construction for digital infrastructure are usually measured in months and years. Major grid upgrades, cross-border transmission lines and coordination of regional rules take longer. Power plants require site selection and approvals; transmission lines require planning, land acquisition and construction; cross-border electricity trading also requires countries to reconcile different regulations and interests.

The two timetables do not align. Data centres can adjust investment plans rapidly in response to market demand, but a grid cannot be expanded immediately simply by injecting capital. Even after an investment decision has been made, electricity may not arrive when a company needs it.

This is the fundamental contradiction facing Asia’s power infrastructure. Capital can flow faster, technology can advance rapidly and companies can scale up investment, but grid construction and institutional coordination follow timelines of their own.

New money can buy chips, but it cannot buy the time required to build a power grid.

Commentary: Grid Development Cannot Wait, but It Cannot Be Rushed

Asia’s grid development is constrained not only by a financing gap, but also by construction schedules, the efficiency of approvals and cross-border coordination. Competition in AI and data centres continues to accelerate, while power infrastructure cannot be completed overnight. The countries best able to connect investment, viable projects and institutions will have the strongest chance of gaining an advantage in the next round of industrial competition.

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