ASEAN’s “Free Trade Concentric Circles”: A Rules Network with ASEAN at the Center

By Yuanyin in Tokyo

The 23rd China-ASEAN Expo will open in Nanning on September 17. This year, one seemingly small change carries a larger message: for the first time, the expo will feature an “ASEAN Countries’ Demand Zone.”

Instead of showing what ASEAN countries want to sell, the zone highlights what they need. Around 60 cooperation projects have already been collected in areas including artificial intelligence, smart cities, industrial parks and cultural tourism.

The shift reflects a broader strategy now taking shape across Southeast Asia: ASEAN is not simply reacting to major-power competition. It is building a trade and rules network with itself at the center.

That network has three layers — internal integration, outward expansion and a regional institutional framework. Each reinforces the same idea: ASEAN wants to be a rule-maker, not merely a rule-taker.

Internal Integration: Building a More Unified ASEAN Market

The foundation remains ASEAN’s own internal market.

A major step is the upgrade of the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, or ATIGA. Negotiations were completed in 2025, and the second amendment protocol was signed on December 1 that year. Thailand approved it in June 2026, followed by Indonesia’s parliament in July.

The revised agreement adds new areas including trade during humanitarian crises and trade and environment, while updating existing chapters.

At the same time, ASEAN is implementing the ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030, adopted in May 2025. It includes six strategic directions, 194 tasks and 756 specific actions.

With a combined economy approaching $4 trillion and a population of around 680 million, ASEAN is seeking to strengthen the internal market before expanding its external trade network.

Outward Expansion: The “ASEAN+1” Network

ASEAN is simultaneously upgrading or negotiating trade agreements with nearly all of its major partners.

The largest and deepest of these relationships is with China.

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 3.0 Upgrade Protocol was signed on October 28, 2025, bringing digital economy, green economy and supply-chain connectivity into the institutional framework.

From January to July 2026, China-ASEAN trade reached $744.41 billion, up 24.7% year on year. Intermediate goods accounted for roughly two-thirds of bilateral trade in the first half, underscoring how deeply the two sides are embedded in each other’s supply chains.

But China is only one part of the network.

ASEAN and Canada aim to conclude negotiations on their free trade agreement by the end of 2026. ASEAN and South Korea launched upgrade talks in June, with digital trade, critical minerals and supply chains among the priorities. ASEAN and India are accelerating their review of AITIGA, while ASEAN and Japan are reviewing AJCEP after more than two decades.

The upgraded ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area entered into force in April 2025, covering a market of more than 700 million people and over $5.6 trillion in combined GDP.

From Beijing to Ottawa, Seoul, New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra, ASEAN is expanding a dense network of agreements.

China may be the largest circle, but ASEAN remains the center.

The Top Layer: ASEAN Centrality in RCEP

Above the “ASEAN+1” agreements sits the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP.

Its institutional logic has always emphasized ASEAN centrality. ASEAN plays a central role in the negotiation structure, decision-making process and regional coordination framework.

In July 2026, Indonesia called on China to support its proposal to establish a permanent RCEP secretariat in Indonesia. Jakarta argues that a permanent body would improve coordination among members and help companies make better use of the agreement.

Indonesia is also promoting the idea of an “RCEP 3.0” upgrade to respond to changes in global trade, digitalization and supply chains.

If a permanent secretariat is established, RCEP would move from a mainly negotiation-based arrangement toward a more continuous institutional structure — further strengthening ASEAN’s role within the bloc.

ASEAN Centrality Is Negotiated, Not Declared

Taken together, the logic is clear.

ASEAN first strengthens itself as a more integrated market. It then uses that market to attract external partners. Finally, it builds institutional frameworks that keep those partners connected to an ASEAN-centered system.

This is not about choosing sides. It is about defining the center.

China is one of ASEAN’s largest and most deeply integrated partners, but it is not the only one. ASEAN is negotiating simultaneously with multiple major economies over rules, standards and market access.

That is why the new demand zone at the China-ASEAN Expo matters.

ASEAN is no longer simply displaying what it can offer. It is also stating what it wants.

In this emerging network of free trade “concentric circles,” the most important point is not how large each outer circle becomes.

It is that ASEAN intends to keep the center in its own hands.