Geopolitics: How the Strait of Hormuz Crisis Reached Asia’s Power Bills – Asia’s Power Balance, Part 3

By Loya in Tokyo

The first two articles in this series examined Asia’s internal power balance: AI is sending electricity demand soaring, while grid expansion is struggling to keep pace. It is now time to look at the external balance.

No matter how hard Asia works to strengthen its power systems, it cannot prevent a crisis thousands of kilometres away from travelling along oil-tanker and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipping routes to household electricity bills in Japan and factory production lines in Vietnam.

War broke out between the United States and Iran in late February 2026, bringing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz close to a standstill. Before the conflict, about 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait each day, accounting for one-fifth of global oil trade. Nine-tenths of the oil and 86% of the LNG shipped through the waterway were bound for Asia. When this route is disrupted, it is not only Middle Eastern exports that are held up, but Asia’s energy supply itself.

The crisis became a brutal stress test for Asia’s power systems. Some countries were pushed to their limits, others absorbed the shock, and a few even gained funds that could help accelerate their energy transition. The effects were anything but uniform.

Japan: Wholesale Power Prices Jump 25% in One Week

In the week of October 20, the impact of the geopolitical crisis began to show up in the data. Japan’s wholesale electricity price rose by more than 25% from the previous week to JPY31.15 per kilowatt-hour. The immediate driver was fuel costs. The average spot price for LNG delivered to Northeast Asia in December climbed to USD29.30 per million British thermal units, its highest level since December 2022. Newcastle coal futures were also about 30% above their pre-war level.

Japan relies on the Middle East for about 95% of its crude oil imports and 11% of its LNG imports. Around 70% and 6%, respectively, pass through the Strait of Hormuz. In March, S&P Global placed Japan in the category of countries facing ‘limited direct risk,’ citing long-term contracts that cover 70% to 80% of LNG imports and a fuel-cost adjustment mechanism that allows higher costs to be passed on. But that assessment assumed the conflict would end within a month. Once disruption in the strait continued into the autumn, the cost pass-through mechanism became a channel for higher electricity prices rather than a buffer against them.

Vietnam: Lower Hydropower Output Compounds the Fuel-Price Shock

Vietnam was in a more vulnerable position than Japan.

In the summer of 2026, the country suffered what was described as its biggest energy-system shock in decades. The Strait of Hormuz remained blocked for about six months, while record heat and El Nino conditions reduced hydropower output. Generation from hydropower was projected to fall by 18.5 billion kWh from 2025. At one point, the amount of power available to the northern grid was less than 60% of installed capacity. The World Bank estimates that blackouts in May and June 2025 alone cost Vietnam USD1.4 billion.

Vietnam, however, had done one thing right: it prepared three scenarios in advance. As hydropower supply declined and coal-fired generation struggled to fill the gap amid volatile imported-coal prices, dispatch measures and contingency planning helped the country avoid nationwide power rationing. No large-scale blackout occurred during the year. In 2026, when 102 countries faced energy difficulties, this was an understated but significant achievement.

Vietnam’s experience shows that geopolitical shocks may come from abroad, but the room to respond is determined at home. Japan absorbed higher prices through long-term contracts and cost pass-through arrangements, while Vietnam protected supply through advance planning and dispatch. The countries most exposed are those with neither contracts nor contingency plans.

Kazakhstan: Using a Geopolitical Windfall to Tackle Longstanding Problems

The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz did not affect buyers alone. For a small number of oil-producing countries, the crisis brought additional revenue rather than a larger bill.

In March, S&P Global raised the outlook on Kazakhstan’s sovereign credit rating, citing benefits from ‘stronger hydrocarbon demand and an improved geopolitical position.’ Fitch Solutions was more direct: the US-Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz ‘increased Kazakhstan’s oil sales to China,’ lifted GDP growth by 1.5 percentage points, eased inflation and created ‘favourable conditions’ for investment in the power sector.

Kazakhstan is using the additional oil revenue to address a longstanding problem: an ageing power system that is struggling with rising demand. A presidential decree has accelerated approvals for the construction and upgrading of coal-fired power plants. Large wind projects developed with China are under construction, including one with a capacity of 1GW. Part of the revenue generated by higher electricity tariffs is also being channelled into the grids needed to expand and modernise the power system.

The crisis has provided Kazakhstan with crucial funding for its transition, but that money comes from increased fossil-fuel exports. The country is using the gains from conventional energy to repair the foundations of its new-energy future. It is a geopolitical wager built on a temporary window of opportunity.

Commentary: Luck Is Not a Strategy

The same disruption in the Strait of Hormuz meant higher costs for Japan, a test of resilience for Vietnam and an opportunity for Kazakhstan. Geopolitical shocks are never distributed evenly; they reallocate gains and losses along supply chains. Asia’s power systems occupy different positions on that chain.

Contingency planning and long-term contracts can cushion a geopolitical shock, but only when backed by highly effective institutional coordination. The deeper problem for Asia’s power systems is that this capacity is itself constrained by complex interests and rules.

Demand is changing abruptly, supply is racing to catch up, and geopolitics is redistributing gains and losses. Yet every fault line eventually runs into the same obstacle: institutional inertia in Asia’s power systems is even harder to overcome than physical constraints. Rules for cross-border power trading, grid-connection approvals, responsibility for grid-upgrade costs, and whether data centres or households should receive priority are questions answered not at power plants, but at the negotiating table.

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